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Abstract
Financial hedging and corporate diversification are often considered substitutive means of risk manage-
ment, implying that rapid development of financial hedging markets will yield less need for firms to manage
risk through costly diversification. Building on a stakeholder-based view of risk management, we show that
financial hedging and corporate diversification are more often complementary than substitutive. Financial
hedging reduces a firm’s systematic risk, encouraging firm-specific investment by stakeholders. Larger firm-
specific investment loads excessive idiosyncratic risk on the stakeholders, increasing the benefits of reducing
idiosyncratic risk through diversification. Therefore, financial hedging can increase a firm’s incentives to
manage risk through diversification.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: G30; L29
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1. Introduction
Firms usually strive to manage the risks associated with their operations. Two risk management
mechanisms commonly used by firms are financial hedging and corporate diversification (or
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operational hedging). Financial hedging reduces risks through trading financial instruments such
as forward and futures contracts, swaps, and options, while corporate diversification reduces
firm risks when a firm diversifies into multiple businesses that are imperfectly correlated. This
paper examines the interaction between these two risk management mechanisms. Specifically, it
addresses the following two questions regarding risk management by modern corporations. First,
is there still a direct relationship between business risk and firm value when shareholders can
manage risk by themselves at low cost? Second, what is the relationship between financial hedging
and corporate diversification if reducing risk indeed increases firm value; are they substitutive or
complementary? These questions have been studied extensively but often separately. In this study,
we view them as being closely related and analyze them together.
The core idea of this work is built on a stakeholder-based rationale for risk management (Cornell
and Shapiro, 1987; Miller, 1998; Stulz, 2002; Titman, 1984). Many non-financial stakeholders,
including employees, suppliers, and customers, have a large portion of their physical or human
resources invested in one firm. These firm-specific assets are often very important sources of firm
value and potential economic rents as they are rare and difficult for competitors to imitate (e.g.,
Barney, 1991). On the other hand, stakeholders may not invest in firm-specific assets as much as the
firm desires since it is difficult to diversify the risk associated with such firm-specific investments.
While shareholders can effectively eliminate idiosyncratic risk by forming a diversified portfolio
of stocks, it is difficult for non-equity stakeholders to diversify the risk associated with their
firm-specific investments. For example, employees, as Treynor and Black (1976) point out, do
not have a portfolio of employers. Although suppliers and customers sometimes can partially
diversify away the specific risk associated with one firm by having multiple transaction partners,
it is still quite common for suppliers or customers to have substantial specific investments in only
one or two firms.
This implies that these stakeholders will care about both idiosyncratic and systematic risks. A
high-risk firm is likely to have severe under-investment in firm-specific assets by its stakeholders.
It then follows that the firm has an incentive to engage in risk management activities such as
financial hedging or diversification in order to facilitate firm-specific asset investments by its
stakeholders.
Financial hedging and corporate diversification (or operational hedging) are two major means
of reducing risk. There are plausible arguments about why financial hedging and corporate diver-
sification are substitutive means of risk management (e.g. Bethel, 2000; Stulz, 2002). These
arguments imply that there is less need for a firm to manage risk through costly diversification
with the rapid development of the financial hedging market. If so, an intriguing issue is why firm
diversification, especially in the conglomerate form, which is difficult to justify through opera-
tional gains other than risk reduction, still remains popular even with well-developed financial
hedging markets.1 Building on the stakeholder-based motivations for risk management, we will
address this puzzle by examining how financial hedging and corporate diversification jointly affect
a firm’s value.
Our main argument is based on the observation that financial hedging contracts and corporate
diversification are not equally effective in hedging different types of risk. A firm’s risk can gener-
1 A substantial share of economic activity continues to be attributable to diversified firms. Between 1990 and 1996, for
instance, diversified firms owned about 60 percent of the total assets of firms trading on U.S. stock markets (Villalonga,
2004). Furthermore, despite the emphasis placed on corporate refocusing due to the findings about the “diversification
discount”, research shows that firm restructuring during the 1980s resulted in lower, rather than higher, aggregate industry
specialization (Hatfield et al., 1996).
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ally be decomposed into systematic risk, which is attributable to movements in the entire market
or industry and thus cannot be avoided through diversification, and unsystematic or idiosyncratic
risk, which is associated with the unique circumstances of the specific firm and therefore is diver-
sifiable. A firm can partly hedge its systematic risk with financial hedging instruments, but it is
difficult for a firm to use financial means to hedge its firm-specific risk.2 On the other hand, by
analogy with the logic of portfolio diversification, corporate diversification is more effective in
reducing idiosyncratic risk but not as effective in reducing systematic risk. For example, a firm
operating in the oil industry can use interest rates or oil futures/options contracts to hedge the risk
associated with interest rate volatility, which is a market-wide systematic risk, or to hedge the risk
associated with oil price volatility, which is an industry-wide systematic risk. On the other hand,
there are generally no financial contracts available for hedging the firm’s specific risks, such as
the risk associated with the R&D necessary for developing new oil extraction processes. How-
ever, a firm can reduce this type of idiosyncratic risk through diversifying into different product
markets.
When financial hedging products are available, the opportunity to hedge systematic risks using
these products changes a firm’s incentive to manage risk through diversification. Financial hedging
reduces the firm’s systematic risk and leads to increased firm-specific investment by stakeholders.
A higher level of firm-specific investment resulting from the reduction of the systematic risk
loads greater firm risk, especially idiosyncratic risk, on the stakeholders. As a result, reducing
the idiosyncratic risk through diversification becomes more valuable when hedging contracts are
available to reduce the systematic risk. Firms’ ability to use financial hedging instruments could
increase their incentives to manage the idiosyncratic risk through diversification, implying that
the range of conditions under which financial hedging and diversification are complementary is
broader than has previously been recognized.
In the next section, we begin with a literature review and discussion on why there is a need
for firms to manage risk when shareholders can effectively manage risk themselves. Section 3
reviews related studies on the interaction between financial hedging and diversification as two risk
management mechanisms commonly adopted by firms. A model of firm value and stakeholders’
investment is introduced in Section 4. The effect of diversification on firm value when financial
hedging markets are not available and when the firm uses financial hedging are discussed in
Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Alternative means to increase firm-specific investments and the
empirical implications drawn from the model are discussed in Section 7. In the last section, we
summarize and conclude.
2. Why do ﬁrms manage risk?
Shareholders of a firm can generally manage risk more efficiently themselves than letting the
firm manage the risk for them. For systematic risk, shareholders can use asset allocation to achieve
their desired risk level based on individual risk preferences; for idiosyncratic risk, shareholders
can manage it at low cost by holding a diversified portfolio (Markowitz, 1959). Based on these
theories, it seems that shareholders generally will not want the firm to engage in risk management
2 There are two principal reasons why hedging is not very effective in reducing idiosyncratic risk exposure. First,
transaction costs for small numbers of hedging contracts are very high. It is therefore either very expensive for firms to
use financial hedging for idiosyncratic risk, or financial hedging contracts may not be available at all for such risk. In
addition, hedging contracts are more likely to fail when moral hazard and adverse selection problems are severe, which
is often the case when the risk is idiosyncratic.
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activities. In reality, however, risk management is taken very seriously by corporate managers,
and the use of financial hedging contracts by firms has consistently grown over the years (e.g.,
Bodnar et al., 1998).
Researchers have identified several conditions under which the shareholders’ ability to allocate
assets and diversify their portfolios cannot substitute for risk management by the firm. Most of
the rationales for risk management developed in the literature fall into one of the following
three categories: (1) alleviating financing costs (e.g., Froot et al., 1993, 1994; Stulz, 1990); (2)
realizing tax benefits (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985; Graham and Smith, 1999); (3) reducing risk for
less than fully diversified managers and/or investors (e.g., Chatterjee et al., 1999; Stulz, 1984).3
Although still relatively underdeveloped, another stream of literature argues that firms may manage
risk to protect firm-specific asset investments made by their non-financial stakeholders such as
employees, suppliers and customers (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Stulz, 2002; Titman, 1984).
While the first three categories reflect financial reasons for firm risk management, the last one
(the stakeholder-based rationale) suggests that risk management has effects on stakeholders’
investments in firm-specific (strategic) assets, which is often considered to be an important source
of a firm’s superior value and competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Such a focus
of risk management is of interest to a broad range of organizational researchers, including those
in strategic management, organization theory, and human resources, as well as those in finance
and economics. Therefore, we build our model based on this stakeholder-based rationale for risk
management.
A firm’s assets can be classified into two types: firm-specific assets and general-purpose assets
(e.g., Becker, 1975; Williamson, 1975). The first group includes physical or human assets that
are valuable only in the context of a particular firm. Examples of firm-specific asset investments
include a plant built by suppliers next to a particular firm, an employee’s knowledge of the firm’s
decision procedures, or products sold to customers with high switching costs. An important
feature of these firm-specific assets is that they cannot be sold without significant loss. General-
purpose assets, on the other hand, involve investments that increase the investor’s productivity
when transacting with any firm, for example, general skills in sales and marketing (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1992).
In general, firm value increases with the amount of firm-specific investment made by these
stakeholders. Firm-specific investments by the stakeholders improve a firm’s operational effi-
ciency and its long-term competitive advantage.4 Despite the benefits of firm-specific investment
to the firm, stakeholders themselves are concerned with the risks associated with making such
investments (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Generally speaking, the level of risk associated with
stakeholders’ firm-specific investments is a function of the firm’s total risk since stakeholders
cannot effectively diversify away the idiosyncratic risk of their firm-specific investments. Thus,
the willingness of stakeholders to make firm-specific investments is a function of a firm’s total
risk: when the risk is higher, the less firm-specific investment will be made (see Cornell and
Shapiro for a detailed discussion of this point). Thus, firms have incentives to engage in risk
management activities such as financial hedging or diversification to reduce the firm’s total risk
and thus to induce their stakeholders to make more firm-specific investments. The fact that share-
holders can efficiently diversify away the risk cannot substitute for risk management by the
firm.
3 For a detailed literature review on the rationales for risk management, see Stulz (2000).
4 The firm and its stakeholders generally share the profit generated from these investments (Becker, 1964; Hashimoto,
1981). The allocation of the profits is assumed to be determined by the relative bargaining power of the parties.
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The importance of risk to a stakeholder’s firm-specific investments has been addressed in
studies linking a firm’s capital structure or accounting method choices to stakeholders’ implicit
claims on the firm (Titman, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Helwege, 1989; Bowen et al.,
1995). The theory and empirical evidence from these studies are consistent with the assertion that
providing incentives for stakeholders to engage in firm-specific investment is an important reason
for firms to manage risk.
3. The interaction between ﬁnancial hedging and diversiﬁcation
In general, reducing risk through financial hedging contracts such as futures, forwards, and
options is less costly than diversification through manipulating real assets. It might first appear that
using financial hedging and firm diversification would be substitutive means of risk management,
suggesting that the introduction of financial hedging markets would reduce the need for costly
corporate diversification.
There has been relatively little systematic theoretical analysis of the interaction between finan-
cial hedging and diversification as two different risk management mechanisms. Chowdhry and
Howe (1999) derived conditions under which multinational firms engage in geographical diversifi-
cation and financial hedging. They considered two specific risk factors, exchange rate and demand
uncertainty, and show that multinational firms engage in operational hedging only when both
exchange rate uncertainty and demand uncertainty are present. Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam
(1993), although their main focus was on the output risk of commodity suppliers, made the
important observation that futures contracts are useful for hedging the common risk that is
correlated with the price of the commodity while purchasing output shares from a number
of different growers can reduce the idiosyncratic risk that is specific to the grower or his/her
locality. Since share contracting with many growers loads excessive common risk on a pro-
ducer, reducing common risk through futures trading can encourage share diversification. While
the intuition underlying this present study is closely related to that of Hirshleifer and Subrah-
manyam, there are distinctions. First, in this study, the rationale for risk management is built
upon a stakeholder-based reasoning, which none of the previous work has addressed. Second, the
research question has been extended to a general firm risk management context, providing broader
implications.
Of course, there is a wide variety of actions besides financial hedging and corporate diversi-
fication that firms may take directly or indirectly to manage the risk associated with stakeholder
firm-specific asset investments. This study has assumed that a firm’s use of all these other
risk management mechanisms is exogenously given and fixed. This assumption enables us to
illustrate more clearly the interaction of financial hedging and corporate diversification, two of
the most commonly used risk management mechanisms and the main focus of previous stud-
ies in risk management. However, the general intuition developed in this study can easily be
extended to the interactions of other risk management mechanisms that deal with different types of
risks.
4. The model
A firm’s value can generally be decomposed into a fixed term (the expected firm value) and a
variable term (the risk). Assume that firm i’s terminal value takes the following form:
Vi = αi + βifm + γifj + εi. (1)
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where αi is the fixed term and βifm + γ ifj + εi represents the variable term. The variable term
has three components that contribute to the variations in firm value. fm is the market-wide risk
factor, fj is the risk factor for the jth industry to which firm i belongs, and εi is the firm-specific
or idiosyncratic risk that is not shared by other firms. As commonly assumed in factor models,
fm, fj, and εi are all independent and normally distributed with a mean of zero and variances of
σ2fm , σ
2
fj
, and σ2εi , representing the market-wide, industry-wide and idiosyncratic risks of the firm,
respectively.
The “industry factor” fj is not necessarily an industry factor in the traditional sense. Strictly
speaking, fj should be more precisely termed a “group-wide factor” that represents a risk fac-
tor common to a group of firms. For example, firms using oil as an input to their production
or services share the same oil price risk exposure, but these firms do not necessarily operate
in the same traditionally classified industry sectors. However, since industry is very frequently
used as a means of classifying firms, we will continue to use the term “industry factor” in this
paper.
The expected firm value and the firm’s total risk are
E(Vi) = αi, Var(Vi) = β2i σ2fm + γ2i σ2fj + σ2εi ≡ σ2i . (2)
Consider a firm-specific investment decision by a stakeholder. An important feature of firm-
specific assets is that the risk associated with holding these assets is difficult to diversify. To
capture this idea, consider a stakeholder of firm i choosing an optimal level for investment in firm-
specific assets. The stakeholder chooses the amount of firm-specific investment that maximizes
her expected utility, where her utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)5
max
xi
E[U] = E[−e−Aw]
where
w = xig(Vi) + w¯. (3)
A is the risk-aversion parameter that captures the stakeholder’s degree of risk aversion. w is the
stakeholder’s total wealth, which includes the payoffs from both the stakeholder’s general invest-
ments and the firm-specific investments. w¯ can be interpreted as the value of the stakeholder’s
general investments such as knowledge or skills that can be transferred to any other firm with-
out loss.6 xi is the amount of firm-specific investment made by this stakeholder, and g(Vi) is
the implicit and explicit payoff that the stakeholder expects to obtain per unit of firm-specific
investment. It is plausible to consider g(Vi) as positively related to firm value: when the firm does
well, the payoff from firm-specific investments made by its stakeholders is likely to be higher,
and it is likely to be lower when the firm is in trouble. These payoffs to stakeholders do not
have to be explicitly measured in monetary terms such as salaries or bonuses. It is very often
the case that payoffs associated with firm-specific investments are implicit, such as promotion
opportunities or increased wage bargaining power in the future. Therefore, we assume that g(Vi)
5 When w is normally distributed, a CARA utility function is equivalent to the mean-variance utility function.
6 For simplicity, we assume that firm-specific investment does not incur any opportunity costs such as a lower level
of general asset investment. However, the general intuition still holds when opportunity costs are incorporated into the
analysis.
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is proportional to firm value Vi, scaled by the number of stakeholders who make firm-specific
investments7:
g(Vi) = a Vi
Ni
. (4)
Eqs. (3) and (4) imply that the stakeholder’s total wealth will covary more with the firm’s value
as the stakeholder increases the level of firm-specific investment (higher xi). From the first-order
condition, the optimal amount of firm-specific investment (x∗i ) chosen by the stakeholder is8
x∗i =
E[g(Vi)]
A Var[g(Vi)]
. (5)
Using the functional form of g(Vi) given in Eq. (4), the optimal investment x∗i becomes
x∗i =
αi
aA Var(Vi)/Ni
. (6)
The expected firm value, αi, is related to the amount of firm-specific investment per stakeholder
(xi) and the number of stakeholders (Ni), which is a measure of firm size.9 The expected firm
value is likely to increase with xi at a decreasing rate. Since xi is the amount of firm-specific
investment per stakeholder, it is reasonable to assume that αi is proportional to Ni, the number of
stakeholders. To capture these ideas, we adopt the following form for αi:
αi(xi, Ni) = Ni · xpi , 0 < p < 1. (7)
From (6) and (7), we can obtain the expected firm value,
E(V ∗i ) =
N
(1+p)/(1−p)
i
[aA Var(Vi)]p/(1−p)
. (8)
Eq. (8) demonstrates that the expected firm value E(V ∗i ) is inversely related to the firm’s risk level,
Var(Vi). Higher risk is associated with a lower level of stakeholders’ firm-specific investment and,
thus, with a lower expected firm value.
Having derived the expected firm value and established its link to stakeholders’ firm-specific
investment decisions, we are able to move on to examine the effect of diversification and financial
hedging on firm value. In order to focus on the pure risk effects of diversification on firm value, we
7 The number of stakeholders (Ni) in g(Vi) serves as a scale factor that adjusts for differences in firm size. For example,
the proportionality of g(Vi) to the firm value Vi should be reduced by half for a company twice as large (e.g., after the
firm merges with another firm of the same size). Without the adjustment, a stakeholder enjoys twice the benefit from the
same investment when his/her firm merges with another firm.
8 When the stakeholder makes a firm-specific investment decision, she does not take into account the effect of her own
investment on the expected firm value. Although firm-specific investments by all stakeholders affect firm value at an
aggregate level, it is reasonable to assume that each stakeholder will consider the effect of his/her own investment on the
firm value to be negligible when there are many stakeholders. Thus, the stakeholder takes αi as exogenous when solving
for x∗i .
9 The number of stakeholders (Ni) in α(.) serves as a scale factor that adjusts for the differences in firm size before and
after a merger, similar to its role in Eq. (4). A merged firm should have a higher α than its component stand-alone firms
given the same level of firm-specific investment per stakeholder xi, because it has a larger number of stakeholders making
firm-specific investments.
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start by assuming that there are no other effects of diversification other than risk reduction.10 In
the next section, we examine the effect of diversification on firm value in the absence of financial
hedging markets. We then examine how the presence of financial hedging changes the effect of
diversification.
5. The effect of diversiﬁcation on ﬁrm value in the absence of ﬁnancial hedging markets
As a benchmark, consider how combining two single business firms changes firm value in the
absence of financial hedging markets. As shown in the previous section, a stakeholder’s optimal
amount of firm-specific investment is negatively related to the total risk of the firm. Therefore, if
diversification reduces firm risk, it has a positive effect on firm value as it increases firm-specific
investment by its stakeholders, holding other things constant.
Consider two firms, A and B, operating in industries l and k, respectively. Their values are
expressed as follows:
VA = αA + βAfm + γAfl + εA.
VB = αB + βBfm + γBfk + εB.
(9)
To make the comparison easier, assume that these two firms are almost identical except for the
possible difference in the industries to which they belong.11
NA = NB ≡ N,
Var(VA) = Var(VB) ≡ σ20 = σ2m + σ2ind + σ2ε ,
where
σ2m ≡ β2Aσ2fm = β2Bσ2fm , σ2ε ≡ σ2εA = σ2εB and σ2ind ≡ γ2Aσ2fl = γ2Bσ2fk . (10)
From Eq. (8),
E(VA) = E(VB) = N
(1+p)/(1−p)
[aAσ20 ]
p/(1−p) . (11)
when the two firms merge, the value of the merged firm is
VAB = αAB + 2βfm + γAfl + γBfk + εA + εB, (12)
and the variance of the combined firm’s value is
σ2AB = 4σ2m + 2(1 + ρlk)σ2ind + 2σ2ε , (13)
where ρlk is the correlation coefficient between the two industry factors fl and fk.
10 These other effects may include, for example, operational or financial synergies, increased market power, or increased
bureaucratic costs due to poor management. In an earlier version, we have shown that the results remain the same after
incorporating these other effects of diversification, as long as these other effects are independent of the use of financial
hedging. The relevant analysis is available upon request.
11 Eq. (10) implies that when a firm’s risk is decomposed into three components (market, industry, and idiosyncratic)
these, two firms have the same risk associated with each component.
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The expected value of the merged firm as determined by its stakeholders’ firm specific invest-
ment according to Eq. (8) is
E[VAB] = N
(1−p)/(1−p)
AB
[aAσ2AB]
p/(1−p) (14)
The value increase from the merger normalized by the combined value of the stand-alone firms
can be written as
V ≡ E(VAB) − [E(VA) + E(VB)]
E(VA) + E(VB) =
E(VAB)
E(VA) + E(VB) − 1. (15)
Since NAB = NA + NB = 2N, Eqs. (11) and (14) imply that the value change from the merger can
be written as
V =
(
4σ20
σ2AB
)p/(1−p)
− 1, (16)
which is positive, since, from Eqs. (10) and (13),
(
4σ20
σ2AB
)p/(1−p)
=
(
1 + 2σ
2
ind(1 − ρlk) + 2σ2ε
σ2AB
)p/(1−p)
> 1. (17)
Thus, the pure risk effect of diversification on the firm’s value is positive. Further, the smaller
the correlation coefficient ρlk, the greater the increase in value from diversification. This result
is intuitive; when the risk is reduced through diversification, a risk-averse stakeholder’s optimal
amount of firm-specific investments increases. Since firm value is an increasing function of the
amount of firm-specific investment by its stakeholders, risk reduction through diversification
increases firm value. The benefit is the smallest when the two firms operate in the same industry
(ρlk = 1), since in that case there is a reduction only in idiosyncratic risk. The benefit is larger
when the two firms are operating in different industries, as there is a reduction in industry risk as
well.
6. Diversiﬁcation with ﬁnancial hedging
6.1. Firm value after ﬁnancial hedging
When hedging instruments are available for reducing a firm’s risk exposure, they change
the benefits from diversification because hedging contracts are not equally effective in reducing
different types of risk. In general, a firm can partially hedge its market and industry risk, but it is
difficult for a firm to hedge its idiosyncratic risk through financial hedging.
Consider the use of futures contracts to hedge the market and industry risk. Let Φm be the
contracted futures price of a financial asset designed to track movements of the overall market. The
actual value of this financial asset is Pm, so the payoff from the hedging contract will be Pm −Φm
when the contract is settled. Similarly, Pj and Φj are the spot and futures prices of the financial
hedging instrument for industry j’s risk, with E(Pj −Φj) as the expected payoff. For simplicity,
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we assume that the expected payoffs of the futures contracts are zero.12 Financial hedging may
nevertheless change the firm’s expected value indirectly through risk reduction, which influences
the firm-specific investment decisions of its stakeholders. Therefore, a firm whose goal is to
maximize firm value will choose the hedging position that minimizes the variance, as the amount
of firm-specific investment by stakeholders decreases with the variance in firm value.
Let ξm and ξj be the hedging positions taken by the firm. With hedging, the firm value can be
written as
VHi = αi + βifm + γifj + ξm(Pm − Φm) + ξj(Pj − Φj) + εi. (18)
The variance of VHi can be expressed as
σ2
iH = β2i σ2fm + γ2i σ2fj + ξ2mσ2Pm + ξ2j σ2Pj + 2βiξm Cov(fm, Pm) + 2γiξj Cov(fj, Pj) + σ2εi .
(19)
Differentiating Eq. (19) with respect to ξm and ξj gives the first-order conditions to solve for the
optimal hedging positions:
∂σ2
iH
∂ξm
= 2ξmσ2Pm + 2βi Cov(fm, Pm) = 0 ⇒ ξ∗m = −
βi Cov(fm, Pm)
σ2Pm
, (20)
∂σ2
iH
∂ξj
= 2ξjσ2Pj + 2γi Cov(fj, Pj) = 0 ⇒ ξ∗j = −
γi Cov(fj, Pj)
σ2Pj
. (21)
The value of firm i after hedging becomes
VHi = αi + βi
[
fm − Cov(fm, Pm)
σ2Pm
(Pm − Φm)
]
+ γi
[
fj − Cov(fj, Pj)
σ2Pj
(Pj − Φj)
]
+εi.
(22)
The variance of firm value after hedging can then be written as
σ20H ≡ σ2mH + σ2indH + σ2ε , (23)
where
σ2
mH = β2i
[
σ2fm −
Cov(fm, Pm)2
σ2Pm
]
< β2i σ
2
fm
= σ2m,
σ2indH = γ2i
[
σ2fj −
Cov(fj, Pj)2
σ2Pj
]
< γ2i σ
2
fj
= σ2ind. (24)
12 In general, the expected payoff of a futures contract is not 0. In such cases, the optimal hedging position is not the one
that minimizes the variance. However, the results are not sensitive to the assumed expected payoff of the futures contracts
and the corresponding optimal hedging positions, as long as financial hedging reduces systematic risks. Since the change
in the expected firm value from diversification is being examined under a given financial hedging policy, any firm value
change due to financial hedging is cancelled out in the calculation of the marginal effect of diversification. The results
follow directly, therefore, from the observation that the firm’s market and industry risk are smaller after financial hedging.
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When two firms merge after financial hedging, the variance of the merged firm becomes13
σ2
ABH = 4σ2mH + 2(1 + ρlk)σ2indH + 2σ2ε . (25)
From Eqs. (23) and (25), the normalized change in firm value from diversification with financial
hedging can be written as
VH ≡ E(V
H
AB) − [E(VHA ) + E(VHB )]
E(VHA ) + E(VHB )
=
(
4σ20H
σ2
ABH
)p/(1−p)
− 1. (26)
6.2. The interaction between ﬁnancial hedging and diversiﬁcation
To illustrate better how the benefits from diversification change when financial hedging con-
tracts are available, consider two extreme cases. In the first case, firms A and B operate in the same
industry (ρlk = 1). We define the merger of A and B in this case as related diversiﬁcation. In the
second case, A and B operate in two completely independent industries (ρlk = 0). We define the
merger of A and B in this case as unrelated diversiﬁcation. We will later consider a continuum of
relatedness between the two companies. These definitions of related and unrelated diversification
do not strictly follow the definitions commonly used in the literature. Some previous studies have
used industry SIC codes to classify whether two businesses are related, and others have defined
relatedness based on whether there are synergies between the two businesses. Here, two firms are
considered related when they are exposed to a common industry/group-wide risk factor, and they
are considered unrelated if they do not share any common industry/group risk.
Proposition 1. Financial hedging increases the beneﬁt of related diversiﬁcation, that is, ﬁnancial
hedging and related diversiﬁcation are complementary.
Proof. We will show that the change in firm value from diversification with hedging (VH) is
greater than that without hedging (V) when firms A and B operate in the same industry (ρlk = 1).
The difference in the change in firm value from diversification with (VH) and without (V)
financial hedging is
VH − V =
(
1 + σ
2
ε
2σ2
mH
+ 2σ2indH + σ2ε
)p/(1−p)
−
(
1 + σ
2
ε
2σ2m + 2σ2ind + σ2ε
)p/(1−p)
.
(27)
Since 0 < p < 1, VH > V when
σ2ε
2σ2
mH
+ 2σ2indH + σ2ε
>
σ2ε
2σ2m + 2σ2ind + σ2ε
. (28)
As long as financial hedging reduces systematic risks (σ2
mH
+ σ2indH < σ2m + σ2ind), the benefit of
risk reduction through related diversification is greater when the firm uses financial hedging than
when it does not (VH > V).14 Using financial hedging to reduce the systematic risk increases
13 Here, we assume that the effectiveness of hedging instruments is the same for all industry risks.
14 We measure the firm value change normalized by the value of the stand-alone firm. However, the results still hold if
we measure the absolute value change. The absolute value change is also greater when firms use financial hedging since
the combined value of the stand-alone firms with financial hedging (the denominator of VR) is greater than that without
financial hedging (the denominator of V).
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the amount of firm-specific investment made by the stakeholders. A higher level of firm-specific
investment loads greater firm risk, especially idiosyncratic risk, on these stakeholders. Therefore,
the reduction of idiosyncratic risk through diversification becomes more valuable when firms
hedge systematic risk using financial hedging. 
Proposition 2. Financial hedging can increase or decrease the beneﬁt of unrelated diversiﬁca-
tion.
a. When hedging is less effective in reducing industry-wide risk than in reducing market-wide
risk, ﬁnancial hedging increases the beneﬁt of unrelated diversiﬁcation (i.e., ﬁnancial hedging
and diversiﬁcation are complementary).
b. When hedging is more effective in reducing industry-wide risk than in reducing market-wide
risk, whether ﬁnancial hedging increases or decreases the beneﬁt of unrelated diversiﬁcation
depends on the relative size of the different risk exposures. If the idiosyncratic risk is sufﬁciently
large, ﬁnancial hedging increases the beneﬁt of unrelated diversiﬁcation (ﬁnancial hedging
and diversiﬁcation are complementary). On the other hand, if the idiosyncratic risk is rela-
tively small, then ﬁnancial hedging decreases the beneﬁt of unrelated diversiﬁcation (ﬁnancial
hedging and diversiﬁcation are substitutive).
The proof of this proposition is set out in detail in Appendix A.
These results can be illustrated as in Fig. 1. As shown in Fig. 1, hedging partly reduces the
market and industry components of a firm’s risk, but it is not helpful in reducing the idiosyncratic
risk. In contrast, related diversification reduces the idiosyncratic risk but is of no help in reducing
market and industry risk exposure. Therefore, with financial hedging reducing the systematic
components of risk, the idiosyncratic risk comprises a larger part of the total risk. Since related
diversification reduces idiosyncratic risk, financial hedging and related diversification are com-
plementary. On the other hand, unrelated diversification and hedging overlap in that both reduce
industry risk. Specifically, while an industry risk factor is considered systematic in related diver-
sification, it is diversiﬁable in unrelated diversification. Therefore, whether financial hedging and
unrelated diversification are complementary or substitutive depends on the relative size of each
risk component and the effectiveness of financial hedging in reducing the industry risk.
Fig. 1. Components of risk exposures and the different effects of risk management mechanisms (financial hedging, related
and unrelated diversification).
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Propositions 1 and 2 considered two extreme cases where the industry correlation is either 0 or
1. To generalize to a continuum of degrees of relatedness, we consider industry-level correlation
as a continuous variable that falls between −1 and 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose the correlation coefﬁcient of industry factors (ρlk) ranges from −1 to 1.
Depending on parameter values, there are two possible relationships between ﬁnancial hedging
and diversiﬁcation.
• Case 1. Financial hedging and diversiﬁcation are complementary for all ρlk.
• Case 2. Financial hedging and diversiﬁcation are complementary when ρlk is greater than a
critical value (ρlk > ρ*) and substitutive when ρlk is smaller than the critical value (ρlk < ρ*).
For Case 2, ﬁnancial hedging and diversiﬁcation are more likely to be complementary (i.e.,
smaller ρ*) as
i. ﬁnancial hedging becomes less effective in reducing industry-wide risks;
ii. ﬁnancial hedging becomes more effective in reducing market-wide risks;
iii. the magnitude of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk increases relative to industry-wide risk.
The proof of this proposition is detailed in Appendix A.
Proposition 3 generalizes the intuition developed in Propositions 1 and 2. When ρlk is larger,
the two firms are more related and diversification is less effective in reducing industry-wide
risks. When diversification is less effective in reducing industry-wide risks, financial hedging and
diversification are likely to be complementary, as the overlap in risk reduction between the two
mechanisms is smaller (see Fig. 1). Financial hedging and diversification are thus more likely to
be complementary when the two firms are more related.
Similarly, when financial hedging becomes less effective in reducing industry-wide risks
(Proposition 3 and Case 2(i)), the overlap in risk reduction between financial hedging and diver-
sification becomes smaller (Fig. 1). Thus, financial hedging and diversification are more likely to
be complementary.
When financial hedging becomes more effective in reducing market-wide risks (Proposition 3,
Case 2(ii)), the magnitude of the overlap between financial hedging and diversification becomes
smaller relative to the total risk reduction due to a larger reduction in market risks from finan-
cial hedging. Thus in this case, financial hedging and diversification are also more likely to be
complementary. Similarly, when the magnitude of firm-specific risks increases compared to that
of industry-wide risks (Case 2(iii)), the overlap between risk reduction through financial hedging
and risk reduction through diversification becomes relatively smaller because of a larger reduction
in firm-specific risks from diversification.
7. Discussion
7.1. Alternative means to increase ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments
This study has been built upon the argument that risk management enhances firm value by
providing incentives for stakeholders to make firm-specific investments, but there are some mech-
anisms alternative to risk management that may potentially serve the similar purpose of increasing
stakeholders’ firm-specific investments. One possible alternative is to compensate stakeholders
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directly for engaging in firm-specific investment. The firm might, for example, make payments
to stakeholders for their specific investments. Theory and empirical findings indeed suggest that
diverse stakeholders, including a firm’s employees, suppliers, and customers, often demand com-
pensation for bearing risk (Aaker and Jacobson, 1990; Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990; Deephouse
and Wiseman, 2000; Miller, 1998; Miller and Chen, 2003).
Compensating stakeholders for risk bearing, however, has limitations as an effective stake-
holder incentive mechanism. Such contracts are generally difficult to write and enforce (Hart,
1995; Titman, 1984). Bounded rationality linked with environmental uncertainty makes it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to identify all the future states of nature that would affect the value of
stakeholders’ firm-specific investments. Even if these states could be anticipated, their specific
effects remain challenging to quantify. Moreover, the firm may default on the terms of the com-
pensation contract in the case of a severe negative economic outcome. For example, as a firm
approaches bankruptcy, it may no longer have valuable assets that allow it to continue to operate.
In such a case, the terms of the contract could not be enforced.
Although compensating stakeholders for risk bearing can to some extent create incentives for
them to make firm-specific investments, it directly increases firm expenditures and thus imposes
costs on the firm (Miller and Chen, 2003). When the risk associated with firm core resources is
very high, it becomes increasingly expensive for the firm to compensate employees for bearing
risk, despite the motivational benefits of such compensation. Thus, the optimal compensation
schedule often does not fully compensate the employees for risk bearing (Shavell, 1979). This
will again leave room for reducing firm risks using financial hedging or diversification.
7.2. Implications of the model and empirical evidence
The results derived in this study have implications for risk management policies and for our
understanding of the effect of financial hedging on firms’ incentives to diversify. For example, we
should expect to see related diversification rather than unrelated diversification in industries where
hedging markets are readily available for reducing industry risk (e.g., the gold mining industry)
since, in this case, hedging substitutes for unrelated diversification but is complementary to related
diversification. On the other hand, if financial hedging markets are not well developed for reducing
industry risk, then financial hedging and unrelated diversification are likely to be complementary.
The results also suggest that the introduction of new financial hedging instruments for a certain
type of risk will affect the diversification strategy of firms exposed to such risk. For example,
introducing exchange-traded oil futures and options will tend to induce more diversification,
especially related diversification, among firms exposed to oil price risk.
There have been empirical studies of the interactions among different risk management mecha-
nisms, but none of them, however, has directly addressed whether financial hedging and corporate
diversification can be complementary or substitutive, depending on the relatedness of the divisions
of the diversified firm and the effectiveness of financial hedging instruments for different types
of risk. We discuss a few representative empirical papers here to show to what extent their results
may have implications on our theory.
Tufano (1996) found mixed results for the relationship between financial hedging and diver-
sification. Using a sample of firms in the North American gold mining industry, Tufano studied
three potential ‘substitutes’ for financial hedging as control variables: diversification, leverage,
and cash reserves. His results show that diversification, measured by the percentage of a firm’s
assets outside the gold mining sector, does not significantly relate to the level of financial hedg-
ing undertaken. Haushalter (2000) examined the determinants of financial hedging policies of
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oil and gas producers, with “diversification” (the ratio of revenues generated from oil and gas
production to the firm’s total revenue) as one of the control variables. His Tobit regression results
sometimes show a positive relationship between diversification and financial hedging, but the
sign and level of significance differ across models and years. Ge´czy et al. (2000) document that
diversification in the natural gas industry increased significantly from 1979 to 1995, in contrast to
the general trend away from diversification during that period. This fact is notable considering that
exchange-traded contracts on gas prices became available around 1990. In addition, they found
some evidence that diversification is positively related to storage, cash holdings and derivative use,
suggesting a complementarity between diversification and other hedging mechanisms, including
derivatives.
Allayannis et al. (2001) investigated the financial and operational exchange-rate risk manage-
ment strategies of multinational firms. They found that although the use of financial hedging was
effective in reducing exchange rate exposure, operational hedging (geographical diversification)
was not an effective substitute for financial risk management in managing exchange rate risk.
Their results show that more geographically diversified firms are more likely to use financial
hedging and that operational hedging strategies benefit shareholders only when used in combi-
nation with financial hedging strategies. These results lend some support to the predictions of
the model developed here. Financial hedging can effectively reduce exchange rate risk, since
generally this risk can be considered as market/industry-wide risk shared by many firms. On the
other hand, geographical diversification is better at reducing idiosyncratic risk, for example, risk
associated with operations in a specific location. Thus, their finding of complementarity between
financial and operational hedging is consistent with the results of this study.
Overall, these studies lend some indirect support to the theory underlying this study. However,
the findings also indicate the need to devise more demanding tests in order to examine directly the
specific predictions of the model. One possible direction for future empirical study is to use more
detailed longitudinal information about the development of financial hedging instruments and the
pattern of diversification over time. Also, it is important to develop a measure of diversification
that distinguishes between related and unrelated diversification, since our theory predicts different
effects of financial hedging on these two types of diversification. The measure should differentiate
related from unrelated diversification based on whether or not a group of firms is exposed to
common risk factors. This may or may not coincide with the traditional classification of related
versus unrelated diversification, which is often based on whether firms belong to the same product
or geographic market.
8. Conclusions
Building on a stakeholder-based rationale for risk management, this study has examined the
interaction between financial hedging and corporate diversification as two different risk man-
agement mechanisms. While it appears at first that financial hedging and firm diversification
may be substitutive risk management mechanisms, the results suggest this is not necessarily the
case. Financial hedging contracts are generally uncorrelated with idiosyncratic risk and highly
correlated with market-wide and industry-wide profit variability. It follows that financial hedging
markets can be used to reduce the systematic components of profit variability. Firm diversification,
on the other hand, can reduce idiosyncratic risk by combining cash flows from different businesses.
Using financial hedging contracts reduces a firm’s systematic risk, resulting in an increase in the
amount of firm-specific investment by its stakeholders. Greater firm-specific investment, espe-
cially after reduction in the systematic risk, loads greater idiosyncratic risk on these stakeholders.
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Therefore, the benefits of reducing idiosyncratic risk through corporate diversification can be
greater with financial hedging than without it.
The interaction between financial hedging and diversification depends on the type of diver-
sification and the relative size of each component of firm risk. The results show that financial
hedging and related diversification are complementary means of risk management. On the other
hand, whether financial hedging and unrelated diversification are complementary or substitutive
depends on whether the industry-wide risk is significant compared to the idiosyncratic risk and
to what extent hedging can reduce industry risk.
While this has been a study of the interaction between financial hedging and diversification, the
basic intuition developed here can easily be extended to the interaction among other types of risk
management mechanisms. A general implication of these results is that risk management mech-
anisms that are more effective at reducing systematic risk tend to complement other mechanisms
that are more effective at reducing idiosyncratic risk, and vice versa.
How different risk management mechanisms interact with each other carries important implica-
tions for firm risk management policies. This study has attempted to move one step toward a more
general understanding of these interactions. The study’s focus on the stakeholder-based rationale
for risk management implies that the results are more applicable to firms that consider stakehold-
ers’ firm-specific investments as important sources of value creation. One possible direction for
future research is to examine the interaction among different risk management mechanisms by
considering more than this single rationale for risk management.
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